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In Part I of this two-part reflection on the European Green Deal, I asked whether the plan has proven to be galvanizing for Central Europe (and notably the Visegrad 4). After talking to Matúš Mišík about it, I can report that the answer is, er, no.
Mišík is assistant professor of political science at Comenius University in Bratislava, where he works on the international relations of energy policy formulation in Central and Eastern Europe. You can reach him here.
A just transition, revisited
So, what’s the hold-up on the enthusement? Turns out, it all comes back to energy justice – and the perceived lack thereof. But the plot thickens. Central European critiques of the Green Deal introduce yet another definition of a just transition. Remember, last issue we saw two competing definitions. One from the Green New Deal scene and another from European Green Deal circles.
🤔
I quote (myself):
To GND folks, a just transition therefore is one in which environmental sustainability is aligned with greater equality and democratization across societal domains.
To the writers of EGD, a just transition primarily means one in which regions, companies and workers in the fossil fuel sector are compensated for their loss of income (and assisted in accessing new sources of income).
Neither is quite the complaint put forward from the heart of Europe. Instead, Mišík explains that often government officials express concerns about the cost of investment. To them,
the just transition is really connected to how much money this is going to cost and that the countries of this region should only play a secondary role. The whole process of decarbonisation should be led by big rich European countries like Germany, because basically they can afford it and we cannot. This is the argument that is often claimed, not by all, but definitely by Polish representatives, as well as other countries of the region. The argument is that after these rich countries will invest into renewables, the price will go down even more and it will also become affordable for this region.
Here, justice does not relate to addressing economic inequality per se (#GND), nor about compensation for loss of income (#EUGreenDeal), but about who should bear the costs and who should take the lead. A just transition is one in which the wealthier and more powerful countries bear the onus of investment.
This objection doesn’t come out of nowhere. It is intimately tied to negotiations of the coming EU budget. Besides the Just Transition Mechanism itself, all other investments towards decarbonization basically have to come out of existing budgetary frames. That meant that Visegrad (and other) countries expressed apprehension the Green Deal might come to the detriment of the quite popular Cohesion Fund (so popular, in fact, that it even has friends!). This fund has served to boost infrastructural investments in the poorer regions of the EU. More money for new funds might reduce the amount available for the Cohesion Fund.
(In the meanwhile, other funds such as the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund Plus will be mobilized in order to match the euros invested through the Just Transition Mechanism, giving countries less leeway to allocate these funds as they – may otherwise – see fit.)
(Via reddit.)
Eastern European energy imaginaries
There are also other – cultural – reasons for the lack of enthusiasm though, according to Mišík. One is the enduring perception of the vulnerability of the energy system, triggered in part by the 2009 gas crisis. As a result, countries – with the help of EU infrastructural funds – have invested heavily in diversifying the sources and distribution network of natural gas. Slovakia and others are therefore strongly pushing the notion of gas as a bridging fuel, that will ultimately safely usher them into renewable age. For the same reason, the ability to rely on the steady flow of domestically generated nuclear energy takes priority over the unpredictability of clean, renewable energy. This ties in with another cultural reason: nuclear enjoys widespread popularity, Mišík argues, because it is an icon of modernity and the ability to operate this sophisticated technology is a source of pride. (For more on the importance of such sociotechnical imaginaries, see this issue.)
As per the treaty of Lisbon, member states retain sovereignty over energy matters, but Austria has had a thing or two to say about this new nuclear facility in Slovakia.
Coming back to energy justice
It is clear, in other words, that there is, some, er, lack of ideological affinity with the Europe of the Renewable Green Deal. The objection, crudely put: if you want it so bad, then you better help us pay for it. If such a frame is used by an actor seen to act in bad faith (*cough* Poland *cough*), in order to shrug off the load it could theoretically carry, it will probably set some bad blood.
Funny thing is though, the argument is not wrong. Rich countries should invest in energy tech R&D and help poorer countries roll out. In the meanwhile, the European Green Deal should look beyond decarbonization alone and address how (sustainable) energy is inextricably tied to other social issues. The Deal’s current strategy – mobilizing private funds – is fine in itself, but note that green capitalism is still capitalism and if unchecked green money too will flow upwards. That will provoke backlash, and rightly so. The EU therefore also needs to set better rules about how money gets spent and who can reap the benefits. Arguably, the European Green Deal doesn’t set these rules. I wonder how many it will be able to galvanize when it does.
Folks, I hope these two issues on the EGD brought some perspective. Thanks a lot to Matúš for our helpful conversation. If your interest is piqued, check out some of his articles below or drop him a mail!
Have an inspired week,
Marten
Further reading
Mišík, Matúš. 2015. "The influence of perception on the preferences of the new member states of the European Union: The case of energy policy". Comparative European Politics. 13 (2): 198-221. https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2013.9
This article shows that in the areas where decision makers from Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland perceive states as vulnerable (that is, ascribe to them the role of a weak negotiator), they support deepening integration to compensate for domestic shortcomings, whereas in areas where decision makers perceive their state to be capable states oppose further integration that could obstruct their ability to deal with challenges.
Mišík, Matúš, and Andrej Nosko. 2017. "The Eastring gas pipeline in the context of the Central and Eastern European gas supply challenge". Nature Energy. 2 (11): 844-848. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-017-0019-6
This Perspective analyses Slovakia’s proposal for an Eastring pipeline and argues that neither the perceived decrease in Slovak energy security nor the loss of economic rent from the international gas transit should be the main policy driver behind such a major infrastructure project. Although marketed as an answer to current Central and Eastern European gas supply security challenges, the Eastring pipeline is actually mainly focused on issues connected to the Slovak gas transit.
Kratochvíl, Petr, and Matúš Mišík. 2020. "Bad external actors and good nuclear energy: Media discourse on energy supplies in the Czech Republic and Slovakia". Energy Policy. 136. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111058
The article I reviewed here.