The Social Life of Energy - Issue #1
Hi! Starting this week I am testing two platforms for the newsletter. You have been assigned to the Substack group! The tests are not very scientific - I couldn't figure out what to do with the placebo group. So for now I'll just try to figure out which platform, er, sparks the most joy?
Bioenergy futures: Framing sociotechnical imaginaries
This week I’ll start out with an article about “imaginaries”, since that is where I left off with my mission statement last week. In particular, we will talk about how in Michigan “state and interested actors work to convert imagined futures [fuelled by bioenergy] into reality [while] local actors define and contest the ways bioenergy may or may not contribute to a better future”. (228)
Michigan used to be home to lot of logging, but much of that industry has moved elsewhere. That opens up other use cases of forest space. Incidentally, there is a national strategy of biomass substation for fossil fuels. Put 1 + 1 together and you propose a biomass plant. Authors Eaton, Gasteyer and Busch, all from Michigan State University, investigated four of these proposals: three of them weren’t accepted, and one was, as of writing, on hold. To the untrained eye, it may seem as though we have a classic case of people resisting new sites for “renewable energy technologies”. In fact, not so long ago, this case would probably have been classified as NIMBYism: folks (selfishly) resisting necessary change if that change happened to have to take place in their proverbial backyard.
But wait, not so quick.
NIMBYism, in newer literature, is generally criticized for being misleading and generally unhelpful. (I could do a full thematic issue on authors arguing why. If you’d like that, let me know.) In this case, the authors show that many of the critics in Michigan opposed biomass plants because their interpretation of what “renewable energy” meant led them to different conclusions than the biomass proponents. (This is probably also a good moment to add that there are good reasons to doubt the sustainability of this ‘renewable energy’ source. Some of these doubts are indeed also voiced by the authors’ interviewees.)
In order to make sense of those differing interpretations, the authors introduce a number of concepts. The first is that of the sociotechnical imaginary. Such an imaginary contains “visions [that] provide an attainable end goal, or [a] collective vision of a feasible, desirable future social order, provided by technological projects” (228). Their argument is that bioenergy is part of such an imaginary, in which biomass would provide clean, “home-grown” energy and generate jobs for rural communities.
Their next concept is that of frame. Frames are interpretations of the world: for instance, a frame can make wood appear as fuel (which Eaton et al. appropriately call the ‘wood for energy’ frame). Such frames can help build up the sociotechnical imaginary, but these frames are also open to critique.
In order to deal with different takes on the frame, the authors introduce their last major pair of concepts: the flattened key and the sharpened key. The flattened key supports the frame, while the sharpened key critiques it. However, they are not simply glosses for ‘in favour’ and ‘against’. The sharpened key of the local critics is not “we don’t want biomass plants in our town”. Rather, it takes the premises of flattened key and questions them: that only otherwise “wasted” wood will wind up in the incinerator, that benefits will accrue to the local community, or that it is a truly sustainable way of generating energy.
Now, why are these concepts important?
Frames and keys are helpful in addressing one of the core questions for this newsletter – how to understand the perceived phenomenon of ‘the reluctant public’. The frames force you to clarify what it is exactly that people are talking about: how the material world is symbolically and practically construed (‘framed’) to address a problem or attain a goal. The keys then help pinpoint exactly where or how it is that different sides differ in opinion. Finally, looking at how the frames are construed and keys are ‘tuned’ in this way, you get a glimpse of how public debate itself generates the opposition that is so often mistaken for NIMBYism. Hence, the authors cite Ann Swidler in agreement: “it is the conflict itself, the need to separate allies from foes and the need to turn general predispositions into specific decisions, that structures ideological debate”[*] and add: “The context of siting contests therefore crystalizes ambiguous individual perceptions into solid public stances” (233). Solving that puzzle – of how “individual perceptions”, “general dispositions” on the one hand and “specific decisions” and “solid public stances” relate to one another – is one of the main challenges for successful energy transitions.
Eaton W.M., Gasteyer S.P., and Busch L. 2014. "Bioenergy futures: Framing sociotechnical imaginaries in local places". Rural Sociology. 79 (2): 227-256.
DOI: 10.1111/ruso.12027
Quotes come from this source, unless otherwise noted.
* Swidler, Ann. 1995. “Cultural Power and Social Movements.” Pp. 25–40 in Social Movements and Culture, edited by H. Johnston and B. Klandermans. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. (p. 35)
Articles that made waves (well, at least ripples) over the last 5 years or so
Political ideology and views about climate change in the European Union
So, one might wonder ‘We have this strong politicization of climate change in the US, but surely they are not alone in this. How is, say…, the EU faring?’. (Or at least, the EU of the 2008 Eurobarometer study?) The article that provides the answer also offers a different idea about why people’s ideas change: instead of Swidler’s remark above, McCright (Michigan State), Dunlap (Oklohoma State) and Marquart-Pyatt (Michigan State) entertain the premise that people’s beliefs are shaped by fundamental ideological commitments as well as party politics.
The key question: is belief in climate change divided along the left-to-right political spectrum, like it is allong Liberal/Democratic vs. Conservative/Republican lines, in the US?
How they researched it: do people who self-identify as being from one end of the spectrum express greater belief and more support for climate action than those who self-identify differently?
What they found:
“[I]n spring 2008 – before the 2008 global financial crisis, the late 2009 climategate controversy, and the resulting politicization of climate change in the EU – there was a robust, modestly sized left–right divide on climate change views in the general publics of Western European countries.” This was not the case in Eastern European countries.
Why this matters: the differences between East and West Europe points to the importance of politicization, when an issue becomes or deepens a fault line in the political landscape. (Until 2008 at least, the climate did not correlate with the left-right spectrum in the East.) Recent populist politicization of the climate bodes ill for national or supra-national policy making, because people’s answers to these questionnaires mimic to some degree the stances they take up in public (for instance, when they vote). Still the question remains: how important are these public stances when it comes to local sitings, such as in Michigan, or for local policies? How much space is there between our political selves and our pragmatic selves?
McCright A.M., Dunlap R.E., and Marquart-Pyatt S.T. 2016. "Political ideology and views about climate change in the European Union". Environmental Politics. 25 (2): 338-358.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2015.1090371
Instrument constituencies and the supply side of policy innovation: the social life of emissions trading
This is an alternative historiography of the emissions trading. (Actually, it’s mostly a theoretical agenda, but I’ll mostly omit that part here.)
Key to convincing various policy actors and consultants of the value of emissions trading was to demonstrate “[…] the elegance of an almost self governing policy instrument that could be operated light-handedly by adjusting an emission cap and leaving the rest to the market.” This kind of argument is what authors Voß and Simons (TU Berlin) call a “functional promise” – the public benefit a new policy would be able to bring about. Another such argument was that it would save money for parties on all sides. The authors distinguish this kind of a promise from a “structural promise”: the possible role that actors might exercise if the new policy is to be implemented - new agencies public and private, responsibilities and new careers for academics, consultants and policy makers.
The structural promise is the key to their argument about how emissions trading has come about. For that, they borrow the concept of “supply push”: an interested assemblage of actors works to develop a policy instrument, somewhat independent of the (‘functional’) need for it (737). They mention two European examples by name (which came after US experimentation): BP experimented with it and advocated it as a way to cut down costs with regards to emissions, and the City of London, which saw an opportunity to become a hub for the ‘market’.
With the analysis comes a warning: ‘constituencies’ come together for the sake of the instrument (not because of shared conviction or shared problem definitions), and therefore run they propose a solution in search of problems (cf. 742). It may thus explain, if not the failure of proposed EU carbon tax (arguably the superior method), then at least the swift move to adopt emissions trading subsequently.
Jan-Peter Voß, and Arno Simons. 2014. "Instrument constituencies and the supply side of policy innovation: the social life of emissions trading". Environmental Politics. 23 (5): 735-754.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2014.923625
Making the most of community energies: Three perspectives on grassroots innovation
Alright, let’s do one more policy article. How should grassroots initiatives deal with policy-makers, and vice versa? Smith (Sussex) et al. paint a picture of two dominant perspective in the transitions literature – strategic niche management and niche policy advocacy – that can’t really address the fact that ‘successful’ niches may lose their true transformational power in the process of, well, being successful. Its technology may be integrated into the broader system, but its social vision probably is not; advocacy for a niche may find attentive ears in “regime” organizations, but only if it fits with existing parameters. The original agenda for change is thus discarded along the way. (411)
They therefore introduce a third perspective to draw our attention to what’s lost in translation: “critical niches”. They create this perspective out of the “critical making” approach in design research, in which design hopes to fulfil the function of critical theory: to make things visible and to empower people (412). It’s more openly “political” in a way that advocacy is not (quite yet). (‘Advocacy’ is generally couched in the placative discourse of “learning” – with the right knowledge, policy makers and professionals will do the right thing.)
They go on to review the experiences of Community Energy (CE) initiatives and policy making.
First, they use the SNM perspective. It captures how the government has developed a “ruthlessly pragmatic” approach that has indeed provided protection and opportunities for integration. However, it does not capture why the UK government developed this support in the first place.
Then they look at it through niche advocacy eyes. It makes visible all the (creative) work that has gone into making CE palatable to various policy frames (from “New Deal” to “Big Society”).
Finally: critical niches. It shows little headway has been made in terms of the structural changes necessary to realize the full vision of CE: the intrinsic value of community energy, the importance of staying small (rather than scaling up), and moving away from the dominant market-based understanding (422f.). There is very little in the way of institutional support to do this kind of project forward (see table on 426).
Showing what is lost is important, the authors argue:
“[R]etaining a critical edge is vital. In the case of CE in the UK, this means not solely focussing instrumentally on drivers and barriers to the evolution of the sector into micro-utility form, nor how CE initiatives might gain influence through closer alignment with the particular political imperatives dominating the moment” (429).
Adrian Smith, Tom Hargreaves, Sabine Hielscher, Mari Martiskainen, and Gill Seyfang. 2016. "Making the most of community energies: Three perspectives on grassroots innovation". Environment and Planning A. 48 (2): 407-432.
DOI: 10.1177/0308518X15597908
Thanks for sticking with me!
Hope you learned something from these brief introductions. Next time I’ll try to reduce the word count while increasing the information!